My Slate piece: 'Born To Sue: Bruce Springsteen's lame effort to back out of a copyright lawsuit'

You may have read about Bruce Springsteen's lawsuit against a bar in New York that allegedly refused to pay its ASCAP fees -- and his subsequent running for the hills. Slate just posted this piece I wrote, which urges The Boss to stay and fight:

It was a classic piece of music industry journalism: Rapacious Big Music beats up on hapless Little Guy, with The Artist, who just wants to make ars gratia artis, caught in the middle.

This time, Big Music was ASCAP, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, which collects licensing royalties for songwriters, composers, and music publishers. The Little Guy was a humble Irish bar called Connolly's Pub & Restaurant. And The Artist was none other than New Jersey's own "rock & roll working-class hero," Bruce Springsteen.

As first reported by the New York Daily News, The Boss sued Connolly's last week for copyright infringement after the bar allegedly failed to obtain a license from ASCAP to publicly perform his songs, including "Growin' Up" and "Because the Night." But shortly after the story about the lawsuit broke, Springsteen's flacks claimed it was all a big misunderstanding, blamed ASCAP, and said he was ditching the suit.

"ASCAP was solely responsible for naming Bruce Springsteen as a plaintiff in the lawsuit," said a Feb. 4 statement from his PR reps at Shore Fire Media. "Bruce Springsteen had no knowledge of this lawsuit, was not asked if he would participate as a named plaintiff, and would not have agreed to do so if he had been asked. Upon learning of this lawsuit this morning, Bruce Springsteen's representatives demanded the immediate removal of his name from the lawsuit."

Sorry, Boss, but if you say you really believe all that, then it won't be you that's on fire—it will be your pants. And since small-time songwriters rely on big-timers like you to enforce these copyright protections, you shouldn't try to back out of this lawsuit anyway. (As of this writing, Springsteen still hadn't withdrawn.)

Please go read the whole thing.

Update: Bruce really did bail. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint Feb. 5, which was just made available on PACER today. The complaint is now completely Springsteen-rein. Isn't that unusual? My recollection is that the caption (which originally included Springsteen) stays the same even after amendment, unless a change is ordered by the court. Am I wrong?

And another civ. pro. conundrum: the sole remaining plaintiff is now Clinton C. Ballard, Jr. D/B/A Beardog Pub. Co. But Ballard apparently died in 2008. Can he still be a plaintiff?Ballard v. 121 W. 45th St. Restaurant

Labels oppose reduction in Tenenbaum award; defendant 'is the poster child for willful copyright infringement'

Joel Tenebaum is a "long-term, hardcore, and willful copyright infringer whose misconduct caused Plaintiffs to suffer incalculable harm," the record labels argued today in their brief opposing his motion to reduce the jury's award of $675,000 for downloading and "sharing" 30 songs over the KaZaA peer-to-peer network. The labels' brief shows no mercy toward the Boston University physics grad student, repeating that "Time after time, Tenenbaum falsely denied responsibility for the infringement, blamed his friends and family for his own illicit activities, and lied under oath":

Tenenbaum complains that “Plaintiffs did their best throughout the trial to make him appear to the jury to be a liar, a perjurer, and a person dodging responsibility for his actions and blaming others under oath for his conduct.” (Motion at 8.) Of course, Tenenbaum ignores the fact that he is all of those things — and he has no one to blame but himself. Tenenbaum has shown nothing but disdain for the copyright laws, the rules of this Court, and Plaintiffs. Tenenbaum is the poster child for willful copyright infringement, and now he asks the Court to autograph that poster. The Court should do no such thing.

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Tenenbaum's Motion for New Trial or Remittitur

The labels spend considerable effort fighting on fair use, an issue that the court has already decided in their favor, but whose ruling contains dicta that could be very dangerous down the road: the court's musing that it might be fair use for a defendant to download and share files during the "interregnum" between which file-"sharing" became technically possible and the time at which copyright owners made their works available in the format preferred by infringers like Tenenbaum. "[T]his fair use interregnum...is obviously antithetical to fundamental tenets of copyright law," the plaintiffs contend.

On Tenenbaum's argument that the jury's award of $22,500 per song violated the constitution, they plow over now-familiar ground, pointing out that "Plaintiffs have not located a single case, in the nine decades since Williams was decided, in which a court relied on Williams to reduce or eliminate an award of statutory damages because of a due process violation.... Nor has Tenenbaum cited to one."

And, in the wake of the court in the Jammie Thomas-Rasset case reducing the award there on common-law remittitur grounds, the labels argue strenuously that the court does not have the authority to reduce a jury's award that falls within the range set by Congress: "a district judge that superimposes his or her own subjective view of the 'right' amount of statutory damages usurps the role of the jury in direct violation of the Seventh Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Feltner, and also improperly invades Congress’ authority in setting copyright policy."

A hearing on Tenenbaum's motion is now set for Feb. 23.

New copyright blog: 'Shades of Gray'

Just a quick plug for Shades of Gray, an excellent new copyright blog from Naomi Jane Gray, a partner at Harvey Siskind LLP in San Francisco. So far, Naomi has posts on the Copyright Office's new deposit exemption for online works, the decision in the IsoHunt case, and Judge Gertner's order rejecting fair use in the Joel Tenenbaum case. I look forward to reading more.

Labels reject remittitur, opt for third trial on damages in Jammie Thomas-Rasset case

The record label plaintiffs have opted for a third trial against Jammie Thomas-Rasset rather than accept the court's decision to reduce the jury's award from $1.92 million to $54,000. In a six-page notice filed late today, the labels said they "find it impossible to accept a remittitur that could be read to set a new standard for statutory damages – essentially capping those damages at three times the minimum statutory amount of $750 (or $2,250) for any 'noncommercial individuals who illegally download and upload music.' (Id. at 2, 25.) This far-reaching determination is contrary to the law and creates a statutory scheme that Congress did not intend or enact."
Plaintiffs' Notice of Decision re remittitur in Capitol v. Thomas-Rasset

Given the labels' decision -- presented to them in the court's January 22 order cutting the Minneapolis jury's award by 97 percent, from $80,000 to $2,250 per song -- there will be a third trial, though this one will concern only damages. The jury in the first trial in 2007 awarded $9,250, totaling $222,000 for 24 songs, but that verdict was thrown out after Judge Michael Davis determined that one of his jury instructions was improper.

It remains unclear exactly what a third trial will look like. As I've noted:

[T]he court, in its Jan. 22 order, has already determined that $2,250 per work "constitutes the maximum amount a jury could reasonably award to both compensate Plaintiffs and address the deterrence aspect of the Copyright Act." Order at 25-26. So what happens if there's a new trial and the jury again comes back with an award greater than $2,250 per song?... Can this go on ad infinitum?

Also unclear is how the court will instruct the jury. Will he tell them that $2,250 per work is the maximum, or will they once again be permitted to return with a verdict of up to $150,000 for each infringed song? If, as seems likely, the jury once again returns with a verdict of over $2,250 -- which the court would presumably remit again -- it appears only the Eighth Circuit can save us all from a real-life Groundhog Day.

Update: here's the RIAA's statement about the current state of affairs:

We have done everything within our power to resolve this case on fair terms. The defendant is someone who knowingly distributed hundreds upon hundreds of unauthorized songs without any regard for those who created them, likely bent on the brazen assumption that she’d never get caught. During both trials she lied about her actions while under oath. Ironically, Ms. Thomas-Rasset claimed during the trials what an ordeal this has been. Meanwhile, every move she and her counsel have made has been with the intent to prolong this case while refusing every reasonable settlement offer. Unfortunately, despite two jury decisions against her and a federal court’s affirmation of her liability and irresponsible behavior, Ms. Thomas-Rasset even refused a settlement offer that was less than half of the judge's remitted amount and that would have been donated to a charity for struggling musicians. In fact, Ms. Thomas-Rasset has asserted that she never intends to pay a penny to settle the case. With the benefit of free counsel, she now seeks to gut the laws that she has repeatedly and blatantly violated.

American taxpayers should not have to bankroll a publicity campaign that the defendant and her counsel apparently seek. But if another trial is what is needed to close the book on this case once and for all, then we are left with no choice but to reject the Court's remittitur and proceed to a new trial on damages.

What's the point of copyright?

The debate over copyright's ultimate purpose -- "to protect the intellectual property created by artists" vs. "to benefit consumers, not producers" -- leaked into the mainstream political blogosphere this week, as Andrew Sullivan highlighted an exchange between Sonny Bunch and Matt Yglesias:

Sonny Bunch whacks Yglesias:

The purpose of intellectual property law has very little to do with Matt Yglesias being able to enjoy a wide variety of new music. The purpose of intellectual property law is to protect the intellectual property created by artists so they are rewarded for their efforts. The purpose of intellectual property law is to punish people who steal that which isn’t theirs.

Yglesias responds:

The point of intellectual property law is to benefit consumers, not producers. I don’t really want to turn this into an ideological food fight, so I’m eager to note that libertarians like Julian Sanchez and Tim Lee have the right take on this. I note that this issue is specifically addressed in the Constitution, which says that patents and copyrights should be granted “for limited times”—i.e., not as a transcendent moral right—in order “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,” again, not as a matter of transcendent moral right.

Who's right? I'm not trying to duck by saying both are, and that these two passages are not necessarily in conflict. What I mean is that the purpose of copyright is (as Yglesias says) to encourage creation of works -- by (as Bunch says) "protect[ing] the intellectual property created by artists so they are rewarded for their efforts." But what's important isn't what I think; what really matters is what Justice Ginsburg, joined by six other members of the Supreme Court, said in footnote 18 of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) about this very subject:

Justice Stevens’ characterization of reward to the author as “a secondary consideration” of copyright law, post, at 6, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted), understates the relationship between such rewards and the “Progress of Science.” As we have explained, “[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause … is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Accordingly, “copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge…. The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.” American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (SDNY 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (CA2 1994). Rewarding authors for their creative labor and “promot[ing] … Progress” are thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in copyright “[t]he public good fully coincides … with the claims of individuals.” The Federalist No. 43, p. 272 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Justice Breyer’s assertion that “copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends” post, at 6, similarly misses the mark. The two ends are not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.

Miami official threatens blogger over comment; what about Section 230?

It's amazing to me that some lawyers -- and elected officials who happen to be lawyers -- making legal threats against bloggers seem to be completely unfamiliar with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a statute that represents a major shift from traditional libel law.

Today's example comes from a Miami blog called Coconut Grove Grapevine. On Jan. 28, the Grapevine published a post about a Miami City Commission hearing on bar closing times. Someone subsequently submitted a comment, purportedly from Commission Chairman Marc Sarnoff, expressing "support" for "drinking and driving after 3am even if it claims the lives of others," and signed "XOXO Marc Sarnoff." Unsurprisngly, the comment wasn't actually from Sarnoff, and his attorney fired off a letter to Tom Falco, Grapevine's editor, demanding removal of the comment.

I don't fault Sarnoff for being annoyed at the comment. (Though I do question whether it was truly defamatory; would a reasonable person really believe that Sarnoff expressed "support" for drunk driving in a blog's comment section?) But I do fault his attorney (and Sarnoff, who is also a lawyer), for the letter, which makes completely unfounded legal threats and ignores the relevant law.
Sarnoff Letter
The letter states:

Please be advised that you have a duty as the owner, editor, and publisher of the website, to police what is being posted on your website. See § 836.03, Fla. Stat.; see also Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). As such, since the post is the direct and proximate cause of injury to Commissioner Sarnoff, it is actionable against you and your web site.

That's just flat wrong. Under Section 230, an "owner, editor, and publisher" of a web site emphatically does not "have a duty...to police what is being posted on [his] website" by third parties. As Section 230(c)(1) says, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." If defamatory material is posted to a site by a third party, that third party may well be liable, but Section 230 provides virtually airtight immunity for the site itself. And the letter's citations to state law are beside the point; Section 230 preempts state law. See id. § 230(e)(3) ("No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."). (The Becker case is inapposite; it merely held that a Florida court had personal jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania defendant who allegedly defamed a Florida resident. It did not even discuss Section 230.) Simply put, unless Falco himself wrote the offending comment (and there is no indication that he did), then he is not legally responsible for that fact that it appears on his blog.

Next come the threats:

On behalf of Commissioner Sarnoff, I demand that you remove and formally retract the defamatory and libelous statements immediately. If you fail to remove and retract said statements, Commissioner Sarnoff will be left with no alternative other than to pursue all possible legal recourse against you and your website. This includes, but is not limited to, financial compensation for damages you have caused to Commissioner Sarnoff's reputation via the defamatory statements. In addition, Commissioner Sarnoff will seek attorneys' fees and costs for pursuing said action.

These threats are empty. Under Section 230 there is no "possible legal recourse against [Falco] and [his] website." He is simply not liable for defamatory statements "provided by another information content provider," even after notification of the statements' allegedly defamatory nature. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).

But Falco says that he "do[es] moderate comments and do[es] not allow any malicious ones to pass," though "this one got by." Does his screening of comments remove his Section 230 immunity? No. As the Citizen Media Law Project's Section 230 page says, "Screening objectionable content prior to publication [] is the quintessential activity that Section 230 was meant to immunize, and courts have consistently held that screening content prior to publication does not make an interactive computer service liable for defamatory material it does publish on its site."

Lastly, though Falco appears to have been fully protected by Section 230, and could have left up the comment without risking liability, I think he did the right thing by removing it. Just because web site operators don't incur liability by leaving up defamatory material posted by others doesn't mean they should. The best way for Section 230 to retain its vitality is for operators of web sites to act responsibly, as Falco appears to have done here.

Wherein I respond (calmly!) to Copycense's charge of 'impetuous[ness]'

Copycense has posted a response to my post about Ed Felten and Sauhard Sahi's post about their "census" of infringing files available on BitTorrent. The main thrust of Copycense's post is that, before drawing any definitive conclusions, we should inquire further into Felten and Sahi's methodology and underlying data. I completely agree, and look forward to reading the final paper once it is published.

But Copycense's response to my own post is really off-base. First, Copycense calls my post "reflexive and impetuous." I don't know about "reflexive"; I saw Felten's post, thought it interesting and newsworthy (as did many others), and did a very short post summarizing his findings and alluding to its relevance to public policy debates. But "impetuous"? "[M]arked by impulsive vehemence or passion"? Read my post; sorry to disappoint those who prefer their meat raw, but you'll search in vain for anything remotely "impulsive," "vehemen[t]", or "passion[ate]."

Copycense then writes:

In this quote and subsequent responses to reader comments, Sheffner suggested that Internet service providers have a duty [sic] restrict infringing traffic on their network, and that this duty should manifest itself in a three-strikes/graduated response policy that has been adopted nationwide in France and is beginning to be adopted in other European Union countries.

I'll address the latter part of the sentence first. Copycense's allegation that I have advocated "a three-strikes/graduated response policy that has been adopted nationwide in France and is beginning to be adopted in other European Union countries" is simply false. I have said repeatedly that I am skeptical of a government-run program like Hadopi. If graduated response/three strikes for ISPs is to come to pass in the US, it will most likely be through voluntary agreements between ISPs and copyright owners (which I do support if appropriate safeguards are in place). As for my "suggest[ion] that Internet service providers have a duty [sic] restrict infringing traffic on their network," Copycense does not deign to state what, if anything, it finds incorrect in what I actually wrote. The "response[] to reader comments" I believe it's referring to merely quoted the DMCA verbatim. That statute unquestionably states that, in order for an ISP to benefit from the Section 512(a) safe harbor for "Transitory Digital Network Communications," it must "adopt[] and reasonably implement[], and inform[] subscribers and account holders ... of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers." 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). There's room for debate about what those words mean, but, given the language of the DMCA, does Copycense (or anyone else) dispute that existing US law imposes some enforcement obligations on ISPs?

Lastly, I want to address Copycense's suggestion that there is something wrong with my statement that the Felten/Sahi conclusions about the level of infringement on BitTorrent is "[v]aluable information to keep in mind while debating net neutrality rules and ISPs’ right to manage their networks and fight piracy." I stand by that statement, which shouldn't be remotely controversial. Of course in evaluating any sort of copyright enforcement regime against an intermediary like an ISP or peer-to-peer network, the percentage of infringing works on that system is highly relevant. An overwhelming use for infringement will justify a harsher enforcement regime. But when use for infringement is lower, enforcement must be calibrated so as to avoid targeting innocent activity. Courts routinely cite the percentage of infringing works on a system in deciding whether to impose liability. See, e.g., Grokster ("nearly 90% of the files available for download on the FastTrack system were copyrighted works"); Napster ("as much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted and more than seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs."); IsoHunt ("According to Plaintiffs’ expert Richard Waterman, approximately 95% of downloads occurring through Defendants’ sites are downloads of copyright-infringing content"); Usenet.com ("Plaintiffs’ expert has testified that, based on a statistical analysis, over 94% of all content files offered in music-related binary newsgroups previously carried by Defendant UCI were found to be infringing or highly likely to be infringing."). And those numbers all come from copyright owners' paid experts; it's particularly noteworthy that even higher numbers come from Felten, a noted critic of the entertainment industry's enforcement tactics. (The law of course recognizes that "statements against interest" have inherent credibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).)

By all means, let's have a look at the methodology and data underlying the Felten/Sahi "census." But pending that, surely there's nothing wrong with noting the findings and commenting on their relevance to the debate about the proper way to combat piracy.

Update: Please read Tom Sydnor's take on this kerfuffle. If only I had thought up the phrase "ineptly affected data-prudery" myself...

Class action vs. record labels over peer-to-peer suits hanging by a thread

Last summer, when Kiwi Camara and Joe Sibley took over the defense of Jammie Thomas-Rasset, they vowed not only to get her off the hook, but to launch a counter-attack to "get the $100 million that [the labels] stole" in the course of their litigation campaign against individual peer-to-peer users. They, along with Harvard Law School professor Charles Nesson, would do that, Camara told Ars Technica, by "fil[ing] a class-action lawsuit against the industry at some point after the conclusion of the Thomas-Rasset case in an effort to make the labels pay back all monies taken in from settlements with file-sharers." Well, the Thomas-Rasset case isn't over yet (and may never be), and the Camara/Sibley/Nesson class action has yet to materialize (though Camara told Ars last week that it's still coming).

But little noticed is that a whole separate putative class action lawsuit attacking the labels' litigation tactics has been winding its way through federal court in Portland, Oregon. And due to a series of rulings over the past few months, the case appears to be on its last legs.

The case, Andersen v. Atlantic Recording Corp., started out routinely. As with all of their lawsuits, the labels first had to identify the proper target. They began only with an IP address and the KaZaA user ID "gotenkito," detected by investigators at MediaSentry, who spied this user "sharing" 1,288 song files. The labels then sued the "Doe" assigned to that IP address, and issued a subpoena to Verizon, the ISP that provided the Internet service to that subscriber. Verizon coughed up the name Tanya Andersen, and the labels filed a new lawsuit against her in her home state of Oregon.

Unlike the vast majority of defendants, Andersen didn't settle. She's "absolutely, positively, 100% innocent," her attorney Lory Lybeck told me back in November, when I wrote about this case for Billboard. The labels took depositions and examined her computer, but they couldn't definitively tie Andersen to the illegal downloading. And so they dropped the case, just before their opposition to her summary judgment motion was due. The judge, obviously miffed that the labels had put Andersen through the wringer but couldn't prove their claims, awarded her $103,175 in attorneys' fees -- one of only two cases in which the labels have had to make such payments.

But Andersen still wouldn't let go. She sued the labels (plus the RIAA and MediaSentry) right back, alleging a massive conspiracy to abuse the federal courts by suing innocent individuals with no probable cause. And she sought class action status, purporting to represent all of those "who were sued ... or were threatened with suit by [the major labels], for copyright infringement . . . who have not engaged in violation of copyright laws." Andersen's theory was that an IP address coupled with a folder "sharing" songs is insufficient evidence even to file a complaint, let alone prevail. (Here's the operative Fourth Amended Complaint.)

Judge Anna Brown dealt a major blow to Andersen's case last November 12, when she granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims arising out of the allegedly wrongful investigation and initiation of their claims against her in the underlying lawsuit. The evidence gathered by the labels and MediaSentry "was strong enough to support 'a chance' that the defendants had correctly identified an individual engaged in wrongful activity," she wrote, citing the relevant legal standard. And more broadly, "The court ... concludes on this record that plaintiff has not established defendants filed a series of lawsuits based on a policy of initiating legal proceedings without regard to the merits," wrote Brown. Still left, however, were claims that the labels had continued to maintain their suit past the point they allegedly knew they were targeting the wrong person -- in other words, that they should have dismissed sooner.

The labels won another round earlier this month when Judge Brown denied Andersen's motion for class certification -- eliminating, at least for now, the possibility of a huge judgment against them -- and also rejected her attempt to file a Fifth Amended Complaint to add new class representatives. Andersen is seeking to file a new motion for class certification (the motion for leave has been filed under seal), presumably based on a purported class of individuals against whom the labels continued to litigate after they should have dropped the cases. I'm extremely skeptical that a court could properly certify such a class; individualized issues of what happened in each particular case would certainly predominate, making a class action a poor vehicle for litigating such claims. And the labels have asked for permission to file a summary judgment motion on Andersen's remaining claims, for abuse of process and negligence under Oregon law, related to their conduct after their suit against Andersen was filed. In their preview of their actual summary judgment arguments, the labels argue, persuasively in my view, that they were acting within the law to protect their copyrights, and cannot be held liable for exercising their right to litigate (even if they ultimately lost). (And even if the labels were to lose on the remaining claims, it's unclear what damages Andersen could recover, given that she has already been awarded her attorneys' fees in the underlying case.)

So could Camara and his team file a separate class action based on a similar theory, even if, as I expect, the labels ultimately prevail in the Andersen case? My understanding is that the answer is yes; principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel wouldn't bar new plaintiffs from bringing the same claims. But the Andersen experience, and the precedent it has established, very likely would lead to the same result. And it's hard to imagine the attorneys would want to take on such a case, while they are likely not being paid along the way, faced with such uncertain prospects of recovery.

Anti-Nelson video: Show me the plaintiffs!

Political uses of copyrighted material are becoming more and more common. Some are fair uses; some aren't. Check out this new video from a conservative group called "American Future Fund," which mocks Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE) for his efforts to justify the so-called "Cornhusker kickback" offered to secure his support for health care legislation:



I count at least 15 copyrighted works incorporated into the video -- and at least 15 potential plaintiffs. Interestingly, one of the specific issues raised by this issue -- the reference to the MasterCard's "Priceless" campaign -- has already been litigated, and resulted in a finding of fair use. MasterCard International, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

'Census' of BitTorrent files: 99% likely infringing

Remember when we were told how peer-to-peer networks would be used for benevolent purposes, like making available the King James Bible, the works of Shakespeare, and The Odyssey? (See n.3.) Well, not so much. From a "census" of files available on BitTorrent conducted by Princeton University student Sauhard Sahi and Professor Ed Felten, a frequent critic of the entertainment industry and its copyright enforcement efforts:

Overall, we classified ten of the 1021 files, or approximately 1%, as likely non-infringing, This result should be interpreted with caution, as we may have missed some non-infringing files, and our sample is of files available, not files actually downloaded. Still, the result suggests strongly that copyright infringement is widespread among BitTorrent users.

Valuable information to keep in mind while debating net neutrality rules and ISPs' right to manage their networks and fight piracy.

Update: See my post responding to Copycense.